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Homosexuality and the Validity of
Marriage - The Developing Jurisprudence
Thomas

Father Green is assistant professor of canon law at The Catholic University of America. He has
been chairman of the Task Force
on the Revision of the Code of
Canon Law since 1972, and holds
the S.T.L. and J .C.D. from Gregorian University in Rome.
Church tribunals are increasingly dealing with cases of alleged
marital nullity because of homosexuality. This article will explore
the state of the question regarding the evolving jurisprudence in
such cases. The author presupposes his readers' familiarity with
the medical literature and will
concentrate on the decisions of
Church courts on the marital capacity of homosexuals.)
How do canonists understand
homosexuality? Tobin defines it
as " . . . that condition of psychosexual immaturity characterized by a predominant erotic attraction for a sexual object of the
same sex."2 The Rotal judge
Anne states: "Generically homosexuality is described as a deviation of the sexual instinct -whereby an individual opts exclusively
or prevalently in his dealings and
erotic encounters for a partner of
the same sex; this is often manifest unconsciously in sexual phantasies and dreams."3
Church courts are primarily
concerned with the psychosexual
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inversion characteristic of homosexuality rather than with homosexual behavior as such. One is
not a homosexual merely because
he engages in sexual relations
with a person of the same sex.
This may indicate a psychosexual
tendency, but it is not necessarily
a conclusive proof of homosexuality. The real legal issue is the
deeply rooted character disorder,
the psychosexual inversion, the
homoerotic attraction and conversion and heterosexual repulsion or withdrawa1. 4 The courts
have generally focused attention
on the genuine homosexual, i.e.
" . . . people who are always homosexual" as opposed to pseudo
or situational homosexuals, i.e.
" ... people who in normal conditions would be heterosexual but
who turn to persons of the same
sex as a means of satisfying sexual tension produced by stress of
particular circumstances ... " S
A key issue is whether homosexuality as such, apart from other considerations, is a separate
ground of nullity. This was not
true in the past, and there still
does not seem to be any jurisprudential consensus. However,
recently three Rotal decisions
have viewed homosexuality as a
relatively autonomous basis of
nullity. First of all it would be
well to consider briefly the tradiLinacre Quarterly

tional grounds for nullity in such
cases.
The marriage of the homosexual might be null for reasons not
unique to the homosexual (indirect approach). Homosexuality
might be symptomatic of an underlying mental illness. Or it
might render intercourse impossible. Or the homosexual may
marry only to create a facade of
respectability. Hence he might
exclude Christian marriage totally or perhaps rule out an essential
property: children, fidelity or perpetuity.
The homosexual's spouse might
suspect the heterosexuality of the
prospective partner and make it a
condition sine qua non for marital
validity. Or the homosexual's
partner might be unaware of the
condition and subsequently challenge the validity of the marriage
because of a substantial error
about the spouse.
Homosexuality itself might be
the basis for the nullity (direct
approach). Homosexuality might
be viewed as such a compulsive
reality that a person would be
irresistibly drawn to such behavior and hence not free to enter
a heterosexual union. Or homosexuality might be comparable to
impotence since such a person is
substantially unable to assume
and fulfill marital rights and
duties permanently. 6
Indirect Approach to Invalidity
of Marriage of Homosexual
1. On part of homosexual.
a) Underlying mental illness.
Homosexuality may be sympto-
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matic of or related to numerous
mental or personality disorders.
It cuts across many known diagnostic categories although obsessive n e u r 0 s e s, behavioral or
character disorders and schizophrenic reactions are reported
most frequently J Such factors
may invalidate a marriage from
two standpoints. An individual
may lack the minimal theoretical
knowledge of marriage because of
an affective disturbance influencing his intellectual capacity.s Or
such theoretical knowledge may
be practically ineffective since an
affective disturbance may preclude the will from operating freely in accord with said knowledge.
Hence the homosexual's marriage
may be null not because of homosexuality as such but because of
inadequate knowledge or due
freedom in expressing consent. Q
b) Psychic impotence.
Canonical impotence is the
antecedent and perpetual incapacity of a man or woman to perform acts apt for generation. JO
Physicians and canonists may differ on the meaning of impotence. I I
Here male impotence means the
inability to have an erection,
penetrate and seminate within the
vagina. Female impotence is an
inability to receive the male member and the depositing ejaculate. l !
Organic impotence refers to a
physical, anatomical or organic
deficiency of the sexual organs.
Functional or psychic impotence
refers to the imperfect functioning of organically perfect organs.
Generally jurisprudence has con197

sidered homosexuals organically
capable of heterosexual intercourse. However the homosexual
inversion may make one psychically impotent for such intercourse, e.g., Rotal decision of Sabbatani of December 20, 1963. However a Rotal decision of Canals of
October 24,1967 noted that an uncertainty regarding the possible
"cure" of the homosexuality
posed questions about the perpetuity of the alleged impotence
required by traditional jurisprudence and canon 1068. 13
At times a petition is submitted
to the Holy See seeking the dissolution of a homosexual's marriage because it was not consummated. This is not a nullity
action, which would have to establish the incapacity for intercourse. The non-consummation
process clarifies the factual failure of the couple to consummate
the marriage, whatever the reason(s). 14
c) Simulation
Individuals presumably marry
without basic reservations vitiating marital consent. Yet occasionally people may externally consent while internally rejecting
marriage entirely or one of its
essential properties. I ; Homosexuals may marry for various reasons, e.g. hope for a cure, social
benefits and protection, family
pressure, etc. 16 Apprehensions
about a successful marriage may
prompt them to propose a trial
marriage (intention against perpetuity) especially if they wish to
create a facade of respectabilityY
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Ambiguous feelings or a positive
aversion to children might motivate an exclusion of children from
the marriage (intention against
children) .18 These grounds may
be connected since "when marriage is entered on a trial basis
frequently children will be excluded also lest they exercise a
hindering effect upon a future,
hypothetical attempt at dissolution of the bond."19
Canonists have disputed the
implications of homosexual behavior for marital fidelity. Canonically this has mea n t the
exclusive mutual commitment of
the parties for generative acts.
The crucial issue is the degree to
which homosexual behavior intrinsically limits that exclusive
commitment. A It h 0 ugh questioned by some canonists today,
the traditional view has been that
an intention to continue homosexual practices after marriage
does not substantially vitiate
marital fidelity, which is specifically related to heterosexual
acts. While homosexual behavior
might be grounds for an ecclesias tic a I separation, it has not
been the basis for a nullity action
(intention against fidelity). 20
2. On part of homosexual's
spouse.

a) Condition.
Traditionally Western canon
law has permitted conditional
marriages. Accordingly a circumstance may be attached to the
marital commitment; if not verified a nullity action may be instituted. 21 The prospective partLinacre Quarterly

ner might suspect the homosexuality of his spouse and make
heterosexuality a condition sine
qua non for marriage. Without
entering into various evidentiary
issues, " ... the quicker a person
declares the marriage null because of the unfulfilled condition
and effects a separation, the
easier it is to conclude to the
presence of a true condition."22
b) Error.
Perhaps relatively few marriages are entered conditionally.
More often the homosexual's
spouse may be unaware of his
condition. Such a person may subsequently allege that the homosexual spouse was substantially
different from the person she intended to marry. Today Church
courts are expanding the notion
of error about personal qualities
amounting to a substantial error
about the person.2J This may include error about the homosexuality of a prospective spouse.
Traditionally the courts differentiated between substantial error
which invalidated a marriage and
accidental error which did not. If
one physical person were mistaken for another, it was substantial error. The so-called error of
quality was substantial only if it
involved a particular feature of a
person setting him apart from all
others. Other qualities such as
homosexuality were g e n era II y
considered accidental and noninvalidating. It was felt that a
more broad interpretation would
undermine the stability of marriage. However in recent years a
concern for personal rights and
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the quality of the marriage relationship has suggested a reevaluation of the traditional notion of
substantial error. 2• Accordingly
a developing jurisprudence considers invalidating an error about
a true quality of the other party,
present at the time of the marriage, objectively or subjectively
serious, unknown to the marriage
partner, fraudulently concealed in
view of marital consenFi and
leading to a relational crisis upon
discovery. Jurisprudential developments have also prompted reformulation of statutory law. 26
At times the difference between
error and condition seems slight.
The following guideline seems
helpful: when deceit is high and
awareness is low, error is the likely basis of nullity. Where awareness is high and deceit is low, a
condition is more likelyY
Direct Approach to Invalidity of
Marriage of Homosexual
Jurisprudence has generally not
considered homosexuality as an
autonomous basis of nullity.2s
However two approaches move in
this direction.
1. Irresistible impulse.
On March 15, 1956 the Rotal
judge Lamas rejected a lower
court's viewing homosexuality as
an autonomous basis of nullity
because of the homosexual's allegedly irresistible impulses. None
of the traditional bases for adjudicating the marriage of a homosexual were present. In fact
the homosexual partner apparently did not experience any noteworthy repugnance for heterosex-
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ual intercourse. Lamas repudiated
any suggestion that the homosexual's irresistible inclination to
engage in such behavior precluded his freedom to consent to marriage. This would have implied a
determinism apparently minimizing imputability for actions affected under the influence of passion.29
2. Incapacity of fulfilling marital obligations.
The most significant development in this area is the postconciliar jurisprudential s h i f t
from focusing on a person's ability
to give consent to his capacity to
fulfill the obligations of that
heterosexual union which is marriage. Even before the close of the
Council, Keating foreshadowed
such a development ..\o He notes
the traditional difficulties in adjudicating the marriages of homosexuals. Then he suggests cha~g
ing the court's concern from the
act of marital consent to the parties' capacity of realizing the obligations flowing from such a commitment. The real basis of the
nullity of the marriage of the
homosexual is not to be discerned
primarily in the components of
the act of consent but rather in
the person's incapacity of binding
himself seriously to the essential
obligations of the relationship. '! I
Whether or not a person (e.g.
homosexual) has sufficient discretion to consent to marriage is
not really the radical jurisprudential issue. Rather it's the individual's ability to assume and fulfill
the rights and obligations flowing

200

from such consent. 32 Particularly
helpful to the courts in this connection is the aid of professional
expertise concerning the dynamics
of human behavior. The key issue
here for the courts is not: "does
the person understand the nature
and essential properties of marriage?" (due discretion) but rather "does the person have the
ability to assume the obligations
and burdens of married life?"
(due competence) .!J
Three Rotal decisions illustrate
this development well. Two consider both due discretion and due
competence. One deals entirely
with due competence.
The first decision of Lefebvre
of December 2, 1967 involved a
male homosexual physician who
married a female philosophy professor. The marriage ended after
three months when the physician
was arrested for sexual offense involving young men and sentenced
to prison. ,1 I
For Lefebvre the homosexual is
often so disturbed by interior conflicts that he is immature in apprehension and will and lacks
sufficient marital discretion. Marrying validly requires the possession of a critical faculty, the
ability to judge, which implies a
coordination of the higher faculties of intellect and will. The
above-mentioned physician was
nervous, depressed, constantly
afflicted with guilt feelings and
regularly engaged in bizarre behavior. His homosexual acting out
was apparently independent of
his will and somewhat unconLinacre Quarterly

ciously caused. A judgment of
nullity was rendered because of a
lack of due discretion.
Furthermore, for Lefebvre the
homosexual cannot give and receive that perpetual and exclusive
right to procreative acts at the
heart of marital consent. No one
can contract for obligations he is
incapable of fulfilling. The issue
is not the positive exclusion of the
object of marriage (which presupposes the capacity of fulfilling
marital commitments) but Ii more
basic personal inability to exc han get h e above-mentioned
right. The physician in question
was opposed to conjugal relations,
married for intellectual reasons,
experienced difficulties in consummating the union and regularly engaged in sexual relations
with young men. Nullity was also
declared because this homosexua1
propensity rendered him incapable of undertaking marital obligatio.ns.·l .;
A second more significant decision was issued by Anne on February 25, 1969. 3G A woman had engaged in homosexual activity from
adolescence until sho.r tIy before
her marriage, ceased such activity
for four years during which she
bore three childrel) and then began to engage in homosexual ac.tivity after a chance meebng with
,another female h(')m(')sexual. The
lnarriage endep after ten years.
The husband sought an an)1\ilmef)t because .his wife's lesbianism made her jncapable of f\.:llfilJing her role as a wife ~nd )uother.
After two eontn\.dktol'Y de(;l:sio.I)S

in Montreal, the case was submitted to the Rota.
The decision is particularly
noteworthy since it explores the
juridical implications of Vatican
II's theological-pastoral insights
on marriageY It is especially significant in emphasizing the object
of marital consent as a right to a
communion of life and love. This
transcends the more narrow preconciliar stress on the right to the
body for procreative acts Y
Anne states that canon 1081
on the indispensability of marital
consent has to be interpreted in
light of paragraph 48 of the Pastoral Constitution. ' " This latter
text speaks of married life as a
partnership and covenant rooted
in the irrevocable commitment of
the parties to each other. Technically canon 1081 covers all possible defects of marital consent.
However frequently the issue is
not so much the quality of consent (e.g. exclusion of a given
property of marriage) but rather
a deficiency of the formal object
of consent, i.e. the inability to
give and receive the object of
marital consent, perhaps because
of certain overpowering sexual
impulses. 4 u
lIe refers to the above-mentioned decision of Lefebvre and
to a.n earlier decision he re.n dered
Ol) January 17, 1967 in the case
of a nymphomaniac, both of
wh.i(;h stressep that no one ca.l)
co.n tract ,o bligations who js il)(;aPabJe of f\,llfilling them. 41 He then
:a sks : can homosexuality ,as ,Sw;:h
PI? considered an p,!;ltonO.IIl.9\,lS

:201

basis for nullity above and beyond the traditional ways of approaching invalidity in this area?
Can one say that homosexuals are
radically incapable of assuming
and fulfilling marital obligations?42 It is also noteworthy that
Anne takes as his example for
jurisprudential development the
truly inverse homosexual condition which excludes all sexual
ambivalence.
In discussing canon 1081, 2
Anne observes that in light of
Vatican II the formal object of
marital consent must be viewed
differently :
"The forma l substa ntial obj ect of
marriage, therefore , is not only the
ius in corpus that is perpetua l and
exclusive for the pu rpose of acts for
the procrea tion of children, excluding every other forma l element, but
comprises even the ius ad vitae
consorliul1t or cOlnm,unitate l1t vitae
( right to life pa rtne rship or community of life) whi ch is prope rly
called m a trimonia l with its correla tive obligations or the right to the
intima te union of persons a nd
works by which they perfect one
anothe r so that they unite with
God in procreating a nd educating
new living persons (Hunwnae
vitae ) ."43

Anne thereby stresses the intimate relationship between conjugal companionship and sexual
intercourse not always uppermost
in earlier jurisprudence. While it
is not always easy to clarify the
components of such a community
of life in practice, the ability to
live a common life is certainly crucial to marital validity.44 In practice it may be easier to demon202

strate that a given individual is
deprived of those elements necessary to establish a community of
life existentially. The courts cannot merely consider the intellectual-volitional status of the
parties at the time of the marriage. Rather they must be equally attentive to the relational
abilities of individuals inasmuch
as marriage is preeminently an
ongoing per son a I commitment
with biological, psychological and
spiritual dimensions. In dealing
with particular cases, Anne
stresses the importance of the
court's considering marriage in
light of the exigencies of the natural law, the cultural forces that
shape marriage differently in various societies and the psychic
strengths and weaknesses of the
individual couple. Some elements
may be essential to marriage
everywhere prescinding from cultural differences, whereas other
elements might be important to
the success of marriage but not
absolutely indispensable for a
canonically valid union.
Subsequently Anne deals with
the case in question and the implications of homosexuality for
marital validity in light of the
community of life and love which
is a crucial part of the formal object of marriage. He is cautious in
enumerating those psychic disturbances that would vitiate a
commitment to a common life.
Yet he clearly states that serious
perversions of the heterosexual
instinct, as in truly inverse homosexuality, preclude the establishment of the community of life we
Linacre Quarterly

call marriage. He does not further
elaborate on the issue. However,
what is important is that the
basis has been laid for further
jurisprudential developments.
Jurists continue to reflect on the
legal implications of marriage as
a community of life and love and
their applicability to various disorders-not merely cases involving alleged homosexuals. 4 ; Interestingly enough in the above case,
Anne did not annul the union
since the woman was capable of
living a married life, had three
children, didn't deny her husband
sexual relations and could have
been helped with a greater measure of understanding on his part.
Despite clear evidence of bisexual
tendencies, the court judged that
her incapacity for marriage had
not been clearly established.
It is appropriate to note a difference in the way the courts
have approached male and female
homosexuality in its impact on
marital validity. Lesage notes a
fairly established jurisprudence
stating that for the male homosexual a truly heterosexual community is practically impossible.
However that is not necessarily
the case for a female homosexual,
who does not always find conjugal life repugnant and whose
sexual propensities do not always
quench her maternal instinct. It
may be easier for the female
homosexual to lead a reasonably
satisfactory conjugal life through
sub lim a tin g her homosexual
drives in various ways. +6
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Conclusion
In general it can be said that
the possibilities for dealing canonical~y with the alleged nullity
of marnages of homosexuals have
been enhanced considerably in recent . ye~rs. This is particularly
true III lIght of the growing tende~cy ~o appreciate the legal implIcatlOns of the conciliar teachin~ on marriage as a lifelong commItment of life and love. There is
no jurisprudential consensus as
yet. However, the nullity of the
marriages of homosexuals is increasingly being considered on the
basis of their incapacity to fulfill
the basic heterosexual obligations
of marriageY The shift away
from a nearly exclusive concentration on the status of mind and
will ?f the contracting party at
the tIme of the marriage and the
tendency to assess the parties' capacity for a lifelong relationship
has enabled Church courts to offer a more enlightened jurisprudence. Likewise the expansion of
the concept of substantial error
about the quality of a person has
also aided individuals trapped in
particularly destructive marital
situations and see kin g the
Church's ministry to begin life
anew within the community.
However, as a final note, it is important to avoid easy generalizations. Fairness to persons and a
responsible judicial practice make
this imperative.
"In reaching a decision in a given
case. attention must be paid especially to the predominate etiology ,
to the ch I'Onological poin t of o rigin ,
to the exclusivity of the attraction,
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to the motives for marriage, to th e
post nuptial adjustment and to the
length of cohabitation. . the ever
present question will be: is this person, because of homosexuality, incurably incapable of fulfilling the
basic spiritual, affectional and emot ional needs .of the partner and the
children on a long term basis? If so,
that perSDn is morally impotent. "48
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